Today, the Senate exercises one of our unique and most important constitutional responsibilities, the debate and ratification of a treaty. And the NATO accession treaty for Sweden and Finland is the most consequential kind of treaty because it commits America to the mutual defense of another country. We commit, along with our NATO partners, to come to Sweden and Finland’s defense if they’re attacked, just as Finland and Sweden will come to our defense if we are attacked. It’s a weighty matter, indeed.
I want to explain why, if one honestly considers all the circumstances and weighs all the evidence, I don’t believe this is a close debate at all. If Finland and Sweden join NATO, the alliance will unquestionably be stronger, the risk of war—and of America being dragged into war—will decrease in Europe, and Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine will backfire in another significant, lasting way.
I’ll note at the outset how unusual this moment is. Finland and Sweden are historically neutral countries. Sweden has refrained from joining military alliances since the days of Napoleon. Once Finland obtained independence a century ago, it also charted a course of neutrality, even after the Soviet Union invaded Finland during World War II.
Now these historically neutral countries have petitioned to join NATO. Why? Sweden and especially Finland have always lived closer to the bear’s den and thus had a different relationship with Moscow than we do. But now the Russian bear is rampaging, mauling a sovereign country on its borders that’s not in the ranks of NATO. Finland and Sweden naturally want to avoid Ukraine’s fate. They’ve concluded, reasonably enough, that there’s strength in numbers.
And they’re right about that. If I were sitting in Stockholm or Helsinki, I’d want to join NATO too. But we’re here, in the United States Senate. What matters to us—what should matter to us—is what’s in it for us. Much as we may esteem the Finns and the Swedes, and we should, they’re great people, we need allies who enhance our common defense, not ones who detract from it. Allies who can pull their own weight, and then some. Military alliances are not charities.
But Finland and Sweden aren’t charity cases. They bring into NATO their well-trained and well-equipped militaries, technologically advanced economies, and vital geography.
In particular, Finland is a country of warriors with a long and proud tradition, to put it bluntly, of fighting and killing Russian invaders. In 1939, Russia launched an unprovoked war of aggression—odd how Russia keeps doing that—against Finland, what has become known as the Winter War. Few observers gave small Finland a chance. But the outnumbered and outgunned Finns shocked the world—not least Stalin and the Russian communists—by matching the Red Army blow for blow.
Ever wonder where the term Molotov cocktail comes from? The Finns gave it to us. What they lacked in anti-tank weapons, they made up in grit and courage. Finnish soldiers rushed Soviet tanks and dropped the bottle bombs inside them. And they named the cocktail after Russia’s deceitful foreign minister for good measure.
Then there’s the legendary sniper Simo Häyhä, who killed an estimated 500 Russian soldiers, among the highest number of confirmed sniper kills ever recorded in combat. He entered into the history books better known by his well-earned nickname: “White Death.” Which also happens to be what every Russian general to this day fears from another tangle with the Finns.
The Finns also haven’t forgotten the lessons of the Winter War. Still today, every adult Finnish man must fulfill a period of national service; almost all of them choose the military. Finland has a 900,000-man reserve it can draw on in time of crisis and can field an army of 280,000 when fully mobilized; which means Finland’s reserves are larger than the reserves of France, Germany, and Italy—combined.
Finland has firepower in addition to manpower. According to scholars at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Finland has one of the strongest artillery forces in Europe, with more rocket launchers and howitzers than France, Germany, or the United Kingdom. It has a strong fleet of fighter jets and plans to buy sixty-four American-made F-35s by the end of the decade.
For its part, Sweden is an economic and industrial powerhouse that will add muscle to the alliance. The Swedish Navy is an effective force with advanced warships and submarines. The Swedish firm Saab produces some of the world’s finest fighter aircraft, radar systems, and weapons. In conjunction with the British, the Swedes manufacture the N-LAW anti-tank missile, which is second only to the Javelin in killing Russian tanks in Ukraine. I would also add that the Swedish firm Ericsson, along with the Finnish firm Nokia, are among the world’s few alternatives to China’s Huawei for advanced 5G telecommunications hardware.
Finally, I should note that Finland and Sweden—unlike too many of our European allies—are putting their money where their mouths are when it comes to their defense. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Finland boosted defense spending by seventy percent and will spend more than two percent of its total economy on its military this year. Sweden is in the middle of doubling its defense spending and plans to reach that two percent goal no later than 2028.
For these reasons alone, Finland and Sweden are not only worthy additions to the alliance, but indeed will become two of the strongest members of the alliance from the moment they join. But that’s not all. They also add key geographic advantages to our alliance.
First, the Swedish island of Gotland is an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the middle of the Baltic Sea—fewer than 200 miles from the Russian exclave and military base in Kaliningrad. Whoever controls Gotland controls the Baltic, which is why Russia tried to seize Gotland in the nineteenth century and why Sweden garrisoned the island during the Cold War. In the event of a conflict with Russia, NATO forces on Gotland could prevent the Russian Navy from transiting the Baltic sea freely or from resupplying Kaliningrad by sea. Gotland-based forces would also make it easier to relieve the Baltic states by sea and air in the event of a Russian invasion.
Second, Finland controls the northern shores of the Gulf of Finland, through which Russian ships must pass to reach St. Petersburg, Russia’s second-largest city.
Our NATO ally Estonia already controls the southern coastline of this long and narrow waterway that is not even thirty miles wide at its smallest point. By adding Finland to the alliance, Russian naval operations through the gulf would become even more difficult.
Third, the Danish Straits would also become, in effect, NATO waters. Russia’s Baltic Fleet must pass through this strategic chokepoint to get in and out of the Baltic. Denmark, a NATO ally, controls the southern and western portions of the straits. Sweden controls the northern and eastern shores. By adding Sweden to the alliance, we further complicate Russia’s naval operations.
Fourth, the 800-mile border of Russia and Finland greatly complicates Russia’s war planning and defense in the event of conflict. In fact, this border would more than double the amount of border that Russia must defend. Finland would also threaten Russia’s major military installations in the Kola Peninsula, where Russia’s largest and most advanced naval forces are positioned to break out into the Atlantic and threaten the United States.
So aside from their military strength and economic power, Finland and Sweden also allow us to turn the Baltic into a NATO lake, bottle up Russia’s Baltic Fleet, cut off its isolated military base at Kaliningrad, and expose Russia itself to much greater risk in the event of a conflict.
All things considered, then, one might contend that Finland and Sweden are the strongest candidates to join NATO since its origin in 1949. We’ll soon see that most senators agree when we vote later today. And how could most disagree? After all, the last countries to join NATO, Montenegro and North Macedonia, were each approved by the Senate with only two no votes. Those countries brought their own case for accession to NATO. But let’s be honest: who can deny the much stronger cases for Finland and Sweden—countries that are far larger, far more capable, and far more strategically situated?
It would be strange indeed for any senator who voted to allow Montenegro or North Macedonia into NATO to turn around and deny membership to Finland and Sweden. I would love to hear the defense of such a curious vote.
But since some observers have criticized their bid for membership, let me address their arguments now.
The most basic argument isn’t really directed at Finland and Sweden, but at NATO itself. Some critics say America shouldn’t pledge to protect countries halfway around the world. But these critics are seven decades too late. We’re already treaty-bound to defend more than two-dozen nations in Europe. Whether we support this treaty today or not, we’ll still be treaty-bound to defend those nations. So the real question today is whether adding two capable and strong nations to our mutual-defense pact will make us stronger or weaker. The evidence I’ve shared demonstrates that adding Finland and Sweden will make us stronger: more likely to deter Russian aggression and to defeat Russian aggression, should it come.
Next, some opponents contend that admitting Finland in particular is a liability because the United States would be committing to the defense of its 800-mile border with Russia. This argument is both alarmist and backwards. It’s alarmist because Russia hasn’t attacked a NATO member in its more than seventy-year history, even as it has attacked many non-NATO countries. Given the Russian Army’s pitiful performance in Ukraine, they’ll be in no shape to break with that record any time soon. And of all European nations, Finland is probably the least likely to be attacked by Russia after the searing trauma of the Winter War. White death is a strong deterrent.
Moreover, these critics are thinking about the issue backwards. As I said earlier, it’s Russia that has to worry about its long border should it attack our allies. NATO is a defensive alliance; always has been, always will be. Neither Finland nor any other NATO country has any plan or desire to invade Russia. But should Russia ever be tempted to attack NATO, the Finnish border creates nearly insurmountable war-planning dilemmas for the Russian general staff. To borrow what U.S. Grant said to his commanders about Robert E. Lee, rather than worrying about what Russia might do at Finland’s border, Russia should be worried about what NATO would do if Russia attacks us. Putin seems worried, after all. He blustered and threatened consequences if Sweden and Finland sought NATO membership, but he meekly acquiesced once they did.
Still other critics say our main strategic focus should be on China, not Russia. I agree. China is the greatest long-term threat to the United States.
But admitting Finland and Sweden to NATO enhances our common defense—especially our defenses in Europe. A NATO that is stronger militarily, economically, and geographically in Europe is a NATO that needs to lean less on American power. We ought to welcome strong, capable allies in Europe who can free up the American military to focus more on the Pacific theater. That’s doubly true when those allies have key companies like Ericsson and Nokia that can also help us beat China in the technology race.
Others have objected that the majority of NATO members are currently failing to pay their fair share towards our common defense. I agree here too; I’m tired of freeloading, grandstanding friends. But how is that a criticism of Sweden or Finland? As I said, Finland already pays its fair share and Sweden has charted a clearer path there than have many current NATO members. And both nations are doing so for a reason more durable than diplomatic sweet-talk: perceived danger.
Some claim that expanding NATO will provoke Russian aggression. But the fact is, NATO expansion is the result, not the cause, of Russian aggression. Countries are banging on NATO’s door because of Russia’s behavior. Indeed, Russian aggression is the cause of today’s debate. As I mentioned earlier, Sweden and Finland have long histories of neutrality. Vladimir Putin’s violence toward his neighbors has now made neutrality untenable in their minds.
Finally, a few critics of NATO expansion love to quote the words of George Washington’s Farewell Address. It’s true our first president warned against “permanent alliances” and recommended “as little political connection as possible” with other nations. That advice was well-suited for a young, weak republic in 1796. But Washington didn’t stop writing where these critics stop reading. That great statesman foresaw a future when America would gain strength, stand up, and assert itself.
Washington continued, “with me, a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency, which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.”
We have gained, since Washington’s time, the command of our own fortunes. One of the pillars of our strength in modern times is our network of allies and partners in the Old World. These beachheads and lodgments of freedom help us keep the awful power of modern war at a distance. Finland and Sweden are two such nations. They have asked to join our mutual-defense alliance, and they are worthy partners.
I urge my colleagues to grant their request, ratify this treaty, and welcome two more strong beachheads and lodgments into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
